Tax Assignment: Does the Practice Match the Theory?
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 29(2): 321-343

Roy Bahl & Musharraf R. Cyan

Abstract
This paper builds on the existing literature to better explain the tax assignment choices made by countries in different economic circumstances. In particular, we explain why the degree of tax autonomy given to subnational governments is significantly greater in industrial than in developing countries, even when adjustment is made for differences in income level. We consider several arguments for this disparity. First, electoral regimes are not in place for the accountability gains to be fully captured. Second, tax decentralization may result in unacceptable fiscal disparities, and, third, tax administration costs are higher for subnational governments and there is not enough incentive to take steps to lower them. Finally, and contrary to expectations, we do not find empirical evidence that giving more discretionary powers to subnational governments in developing countries will lead to a crowding out of central revenues, but we do find this result for industrial countries.
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The Consequences of Fiscal Decentralization on Poverty and Income Equality
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 29(2): 321-343

Cristian F. Sepulveda & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez

Abstract
Many countries around the world are currently pursuing policies for poverty reduction and the improvement of income distribution, and most of them are also implementing fiscal decentralization reforms. Although, separately, fiscal decentralization, poverty, and the distribution of income have been the subjects of extensive theoretical and empirical research, to date we have little understanding of what may be the impact of fiscal decentralization on poverty and inequality. We set out to shed some light on those relationships. We describe the possible channels through which fiscal decentralization might affect poverty and income inequalities and carry out an empirical analysis using panel data for a large number of countries. We find that fiscal decentralization may have significant effects on poverty and inequality. In particular, fiscal decentralization appears to lead to increases in the poverty measures we use, but it also appears to reduce income inequality if the general government represents a significant share of the economy
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