URAG Working Paper #04-07
Squatting, Eviction and Development (pdf)
by Geoffrey K. Turnbull,
March 2004
Keywords: Land property rights, squatting, eviction, land development
This paper explains both squatting and preemptive eviction by landowners
within the context of incomplete land markets. The model shows that squatting
is not inevitable in incomplete property markets; instead, it arises from
optimal landowner decisions not to fully exercise property rights. The
analysis explains why squatters' housing investments and owners' preemptive
eviction rates tend to be higher than efficient and why eviction rates
for open property are inefficiently high. It also examines informal land
markets comprising potential squatters and owners and shows why they need
not fully resolve inefficient squatter investment and landowner eviction
decisions.
Comments and questions regarding this paper may be directed to Geoffrey
Turnbull at gturnbull@gsu.edu.
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